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  I develop a formal model of bureaucratic policymaking to investigate why a legislature 
would choose to delegate authority to a bureaucratic agency whose actions can be controlled, ex 
post, by an executive with divergent policy preferences.  Because the executive and legislature 
might find different policies to be salient to their constituencies, I demonstrate that executive 
review of agency rulemaking can benefit both branches of government, relative to legislative 
delegation without the possibility of such review.  In trying to undermine the impacts of 
executive oversight, agencies propose policies that could benefit the legislature were the 
executive to choose not to intervene in agency policymaking.  Likewise, if the executive does 
intervene, executive review allows him to implement a policy more desirable than absent such 
review.  This joint-desirability of executive review is more likely when legislative and executive 
policy preferences are relatively aligned, and when legislative and agency policy preferences are 
relatively divergent.  The broader social welfare consequences of executive review depend on the 
relative effectiveness of the executive’s oversight of agency policymaking.  These results 
provide insight for why mediating lawmaking institutions such as the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Analysis (OIRA) continue to survive in a separation of powers system despite their 




Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies 
 
Alan E. Wiseman 
 
 
The Office of Management and Budget is probably the most powerful agency 
in the federal government.  Because of the Office’s carefully maintained low 
profile, however, the public is generally unaware of OMB’s influence on 
federal policy.  A wide array of powers has made OMB an influential, near 
omnipresent force within the executive branch. (Olson 1984, 5) 
 
The word most often used to describe the office to which Professor Graham 
has been nominated—the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs—is 
“obscure.”  Few are aware of OIRA, or of just how powerful the position of 
“regulatory czar” really is.  But this office—this senior White House staff 
position—exercises enormous authority over every major federal regulation 
that the government has under consideration. 
 
--Prepared Statement of Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) at 
confirmation hearing of John D. Graham to be the Administrator of 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of 





  One of the most fundamental and enduring conflicts in American politics is waged 
between the legislative and executive branches of national government, over which entity should 
control policymaking.  With the growth of the American administrative state over the past 200 
years, this conflict has increasingly been played out in the federal bureaucracy.  Scholars who 
study the bureaucracy in relation to Congress (e.g., McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; 
Weingast and Moran 1983) and the presidency (e.g., Moe 1985, 1989) typically focus on how 
one branch or the other controls the bureaucracy and its policy outputs.  Implicit in this 
scholarship is the notion that whichever branch controls the bureaucracy gains an advantage by 
imposing its policy interests on the other.  Bureaucratic policymaking, in other words, is seen as 
an extension of a zero-sum contest, in that what one branch gains the other loses.   
  In contrast to this approach, I argue that bureaucratic agencies can be understood and 
explained better by viewing them as rationally designed institutions that allow both branches of 
government to efficiently represent different and competing constituency interests.  Bureaucracy, 
in other words, is better conceptualized as the result of a positive-sum game between the 2 
legislative and executive branches.  This perspective has very different implications for our 
understanding of the creation, evolution, and survival of bureaucratic agencies.  Under the zero-
sum approach, evidence of control by one branch implies defeat and failure by the other, which 
in turn implies that the losing branch will attempt to reorganize the bureaucracy.  The positive-
sum approach, in contrast, implies that bureaucratic organizations, because they can efficiently 
serve the competing interests of both branches, will be far more stable and enduring. 
  I advance this argument by developing a formal model of legislative delegation and 
agency policymaking where agency actions are subject to review by an executive whose 
preferences diverge from the legislature.  To illustrate the implications of this theory, I focus on a 
substantively important agency in the federal government: the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Since 1981, all 
executive (non-independent) agencies have been required to receive OIRA approval for their 
rules before they are published in the Federal Register, which has ostensibly provided the 
President with substantial control over agency policymaking.  Scholars and pundits have 
generally agreed that OIRA favors the President over Congress, and some have argued that 
Congress would prefer to abolish OIRA altogether.  Given this apparent conflict, one wonders 
how and why OIRA review continues to be a vital part of contemporary American 
policymaking?  The theory developed below answers this question by demonstrating how an 
apparently coercive institution such as OIRA can actually be valuable to both branches of 
government by simultaneously representing their competing interests. 
While several influential works in delegation and agency policymaking (e.g., Bendor and 
Meirowitz 2004, Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) demonstrate the potential for bureaucratic 
institutions to benefit both the executive and legislature, these benefits generally follow from the 
informational expertise that bureaucracies presumably provide.  While these explanations are 
quite plausible, for several reasons considered below, these models do not accurately 
characterize certain aspects of contemporary administrative policymaking.  In what follows, I 
advance a new perspective that accounts for these features by analyzing a model where there is 
no uncertainty regarding the relationships between policies and outcomes, and demonstrate that 
even without the potential for informational benefits, a potentially coercive institution such as 
OIRA can still provide benefits to both branches of government. 3 
More specifically, I analyze a policymaking environment where actors are uncertain, ex 
ante, about whether particular policy choices will be salient to their interests, ex post.  Because 
there is a possibility that the Executive will find a given policy to be salient, leading to OIRA 
oversight, a strategic agency will try to undermine the effects of OIRA review by proposing 
policies that deviate from its interests and generally favor the legislature over the executive.  
Hence, when OIRA does not intervene, the agency’s legislature-friendly policy will be enacted, 
making the legislature better off than what would occur if OIRA did not exist (whereby the 
agency’s policies would be more reflective of the agency’s policy interests).  Similarly, if OIRA 
does intervene, it will move policy away from the legislature towards the executive’s interests, 
making the executive clearly better off than if OIRA intervention was not possible.  Depending 
on how often the legislative and executive find the same policies salient to their constituencies, 
ex post, OIRA intervention can actually benefit both branches of government.  This finding 
stands in stark contrast to literature and casual observation which argues that executive review 
unambiguously benefits the President at the expense of Congress.   
The fact that an apparently coercive institution can be shown to benefit both the President 
and Congress raises broad questions about the appropriateness of conventional zero-sum 
characterizations of executive-legislative-agency politics.  These conclusions are particularly 
relevant in light of recent developments in state politics where governors have begun 
establishing state-level counterparts to OIRA (Teske 2004, 208-215), as well as the recent 
proliferation of analogous institutions in several OECD countries (OECD 2003).   
In the next sections, I provide a brief introduction to the history and process of OIRA 
review, and consider how this institution is relevant to the prevailing body of scholarship on 
delegation, rulemaking, and presidential policymaking.  I then present a formal model of 
delegation with competing oversight and note the empirical implications that follow from such a 
model.  Finally, I conclude with a summary of findings and a discussion of further empirical and 
theoretical extensions to this work. 
 
2. OIRA History and Process
 
OIRA review, also known as executive review or executive clearance, is a pervasive 
feature of contemporary agency policymaking.  While agencies have been creating more (and 
more detailed) rules over the past twenty-five years, publishing nearly 8,000 in the beginning of 4 
the Bush Administration in 1989 to more than 35,000 rules in the beginning of the current Bush 
Administration in 2001 (Kerwin 2003, 20), presidential intervention through OIRA has increased 
immensely.
1 Whereas less than 10% of agency rules were changed before publication in the 
Federal Register following OIRA intervention in 1981 (Croley 2003, 848-849), nearly 70% of 
rules were either changed following OIRA review or entirely withdrawn by the submitting 
agency in 2001 (Kerwin 2003, 226).   
  While executive review has its precedents in the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations, 
its current incarnation effectively began in the Reagan Administration in fall 1981, with the 
enactment of Executive Order 12291.
2 As originally promulgated, EO 12291 required all federal 
agencies, other than independent regulatory agencies, to submit drafts of proposed and final rules 
to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before publication in the 
Federal Register.  Furthermore, all “major rules,” defined as those that were likely to impose an 
annual cost greater than $100 million on the U.S. economy, to impose major costs on consumers 
or particular geographic regions, or to have a significant negative impact on various aspects of 
market competition, would have to be accompanied by a regulatory impact analysis statement.
3  
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which had been created under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and located within the OMB, would review proposed rules to 
determine whether they were costs-justified, and generally comported with the Administration’s 
regulatory priorities.  If OIRA did not agree with the content of the rule as submitted, it was sent 
back to the agency for further analysis, and the agency was de facto compelled to acquiesce to 
OIRA’s demands before the rule could be published in the Federal Register.
4   
   EO 12866, which was promulgated under the Clinton Administration in 1993 on the 
precedents of the Reagan Administration, dictates the terms of contemporary OIRA review, 
whereby agencies are required to submit any rule regarded as “significant” regulatory action 
                                                           
1 These aggregate statistics mask substantial variation.  In the last year of the Clinton Administration between 
24,000 rules and nearly 18,000 proposed rules were published in the Federal Register (Kerwin 2003, 19-20). 
2 United States General Accounting Office (2003, 19-25) provides a detailed history of the development of OIRA 
review.  Only certain highlights are considered here. 
3 EO 12291 required that all major rules be submitted to the Director of OMB 60 days prior to publication of notice 
in the Federal Register, and 30 days prior to their final publication.  Non-“major” rules were also required to be 
submitted to OMB, but only 10 days prior to the publication of notice, and their final publication. 
4 As noted by Olson (1984, 43), EO 12291 did not endow OMB with veto power over an agency rule, but the Order 
provided “that the agency ‘shall … refrain from publishing’ its rule ‘until the agency has responded to the [OMB] 
Director’s views, and incorporated those views and the agency’s response in the rulemaking file.’” 5 
(United States General Accounting Office 2003, 23) to OIRA.
 5  Similar to the Reagan Executive 
Order, the term “significant” pertains to any rule that is likely to have a sizeable negative impact 
(greater than $100 million annually) on the economy, to create contradictions or other 
inconsistencies with existing law or regulatory practices, or to potentially run counter to the 
regulatory mission of the Administration.
6  Hence, while not explicitly requiring review for all 
agency rules, EO 12866 affords the Administration a good deal of latitude with which to 
influence the regulatory process.
7
  Under EO 12866, an agency must submit a proposed rule for review to OIRA before the 
“notice of proposed rulemaking” is published in the Federal Register.  OIRA review is supposed 
to occur within 90 calendar days following submission, and barring OIRA objection, the 
proposed rule is then published in the Federal Register.  Following publication, the rule 
undergoes the conventional notice and comment period as required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) wherein various public and private sector stakeholders correspond with the 
agency to convey their preferences about the rule, which will presumably be addressed in the 
agency’s final version of the rule.  Following the notice and comment period, the agency adopts 
a final rule, which must then be submitted to OIRA for a second round of review.  At this stage, 
OIRA can either conclude that the rule is “consistent with the principles of the executive order,” 
or return it to the agency for “further consideration” (United States General Accounting Office 
2003, 31).  While OIRA does not have de jure authority to disapprove draft rules, EO 12866 
does require this explicit review process, and hence, rules that are sent back to agencies for 
“further consideration” are typically either withdrawn by the agency or revised by the agency to 
comport with OIRA concerns.
8  
  Numerous case studies have clearly illustrated how OIRA intervention has had 
significant substantive impacts on rules.  Bruff (1985, 570) for example, discusses how OIRA 
                                                           
5 In establishing EO 12866, the Clinton administration revoked the earlier EO 12291, as well as EO 12498, which 
was established in 1985 and required agencies to submit a statement of their regulatory priorities to the Director of 
the OMB each year, noting how the agency’s goals and priorities were consistent with the Administration’s goals. 
6 Because only significant rules were required to be submitted for clearance, it should be no surprise that the 
workload of OIRA fell substantially following the enactment of EO 12866, from 2000-3000 rules reviewed each 
year to 500-700 rules reviewed per year (United States General Accounting Office 2003, 24).  
7 EO 12866 provided for several other measures, including transparency requirements during regulatory review.  For 
example, OIRA is now required to document communications between OIRA and external parties during the review 
process.  Agencies are also required to submit annual regulatory plans to OIRA. 
8 Less than 3 percent of rules are coded as “returned” to agencies, meaning that they were returned and not 
subsequently altered to comport with OIRA review (United States General Accounting Office 2003, fn 3). 6 
intervened in OSHA’s rulemaking proceedings for the regulation of ethylene oxide, a potentially 
carcinogenic cleansing agent used for sterilizing medical instruments.  In response to a court 
mandate that it issue standards by June 15, 1984, OSHA sent a rule to OIRA for review on June 
13 that established a permanent exposure limit (PEL) and a short term exposure limit (STEL) for 
ethylene oxide at one part per million, and ten parts per million, respectively.  OIRA quickly 
responded to OSHA, stating that the STEL was not cost effective, and was also not supported by 
the relevant medical data.  In response to this review, OSHA issued a rule on June 15 that was 
stripped of all references to the STEL, despite the court’s mandate to issue a rule providing for 
permanent and short-term exposure limits. 
  Similarly, at a 1986 Senate oversight hearing on OIRA, Deborah Berkowitz, of the AFL-
CIO, testified that OIRA had consistently stifled OSHA’s six-year effort to establish safety 
standards to prevent grain dust explosions in grain elevators (United States Government Printing 
Office 1986, 2-4).  Berkowitz argued that, in response to a 1982 National Academy of Science 
study that determined that nearly 80% of U.S. grain elevators were ripe for explosions due to 
grain dust buildups, OSHA began a 10-month long rulemaking proceeding.  After sending a rule 
to OIRA in 1983, the review process lasted eight months, and culminated in OIRA mandating 
that OSHA effectively exempt smaller elevators from increased sweeping requirements.   
Moreover, to ensure that the rule would comply with OIRA review, OSHA’s final rule exempted 
10,415 of the 11,200 operating grain elevators in the United States from dust control provisions.   
While these examples demonstrate that OIRA intervention has real policy influence over 
final rules, it is reasonable to suggest that the final policies promulgated following OIRA 
intervention are still entirely consistent with the preferences of Congress, and that no obvious 
conflict exists.  Perhaps OIRA review merely alters policies within the bounds of discretion (e.g., 
Epstein and O’Halloran 1999) that Congress typically provides to agencies.  Consideration of 
other instances of OIRA intervention, however, suggests that executive clearance can induce 
policy changes that are entirely counter to congressional intent.  On this point, Heizerling (2006) 
documents OIRA intervention in the EPA’s recent rulemaking over water intake structures at 
existing power plant (the “Phase II rule”).   
  Based on section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, the Phase II rule was intended to limit 
the large number of fish that were killed by water intakes used for cooling machinery at power 
plants.  When the EPA originally submitted the Phase II rule to OIRA in 2001, the rule required 7 
the largest power plants to employ closed-cycle recirculating cooling, which had been deemed 
the most effective technology available for addressing the fish problem (Heizerling 2006, 108).  
Despite the explicit mandate of the Clean Water Act that environmental rules be based on the 
best technological standards available for controlling pollution, OIRA removed the closed-cycle 
recirculating cooling requirement, and inserted a “compliance alternative” whereby facilities 
would be allowed to ignore the regulations if they were not cost effective.  According to 
Heizerling (2006, 110), substituting a cost-benefit criterion for technology based regulation 
clearly contradicts the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act (as established in Weyerhaeuser Co 
v. Costle 1978), and is inconsistent with congressional intent.  Hence, it appears that OIRA 
intervention can clearly influence the substantive content of rules, which may even go beyond 
the bounds of congressionally-authorized agency discretion. 
 
 
3. Existing Research 
 
  On its face, OIRA intervention could be interpreted as being coercive in that it “allows 
the president and his agents to monitor and influence the substance of individual regulations” 
(Cooper and West 1988, 871).  Hence, executive review might undermine the administrative 
safeguards that were created under the Administrative Procedure Act (Cooper and West 1988, 
873); and as a result, agency decisions will benefit the interests of the president, and be “based 
on considerations relating to political goals and incentives rather than considerations relating to 
the substantive implications or requirements of statute” (Cooper and West 1988, 882). 
  While the above examples provide anecdotal support for such arguments, it is not entirely 
clear whether such broad claims regarding the presidential usurpation of agency authority, and 
the policy consequences of OIRA intervention, are entirely accurate.
9  First, from a theoretical 
perspective, the prevailing scholarship on delegation and bureaucratic policymaking offers little 
insight on the role of OIRA, for the simple fact that these theories typically consider relations 
between one principal and one agent, without the prospect for ex post oversight by a competing 
principal.
10  Epstein and O’Halloran (1994, 1999), for example, model legislative delegation to 
                                                           
9 Jordan (2006), for example, argues that OIRA review allows the President to maintain preference alignment 
between himself and his appointees, rather than a means with which to implement ex post rule changes.  
10 See Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond (2001), and Huber and Shipan (2000) for recent reviews of the delegation 
literature in political science.  Recent work by Gailmard and Patty (2006) deviates from this conventional 
framework, in modeling information transmission and agency policymaking in a separation of powers system. 8 
an agency that unilaterally makes policy, subject to a bound of discretion afforded to them by the 
legislature, where agency and executive preferences are perfectly aligned.  Given that OIRA 
changes a substantial portion of agency rules, however, it is questionable whether the preference-
alignment assumption is appropriate.  My model builds on this point in analyzing a policy 
environment where the agency, legislature, and executive have competing policy interests; and 
hence, the executive has an obvious incentive to engage in ex post oversight through OIRA.
11
  McCubbins, Noll and Weingast’s (1987, 1989) work on administrative procedures does 
consider the potential effects of preference divergence among the President, the agency, and the 
legislature, yet they, too, do not explicitly account for the possibility of ex post executive control 
in a way that is reflective of OIRA intervention.  While Kiewiet and McCubbins briefly consider 
OIRA intervention in their work on the appropriations process, and even suggest (1991, 182) that 
Congress “appears to have achieved some sort of working relationship with OIRA and its 
regulatory review activities,” the rationale for congressional acquiescence is not transparent.   
More generally, it is not obvious why Congress might accept, or even prefer, OIRA intervention 
compared to the policy choices of an unconstrained agency. 
  Second, while scholars of administrative policymaking have made recent advances in 
understanding how different practices such as regulatory negotiation (e.g, Balla and Wright 
2003; Coglianese 1997), advisory committee participation (e.g, Balla and Wright 2001; Petracca 
1986), or the expansion of informal communications with agencies (e.g., Balla 2004/2005) have 
influenced the development of rules, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to OIRA.  
Instead, most research considering agency oversight has focused on the role of the courts 
following the publication of the rule (e.g, Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992; McNollGast 1994), rather 
than the actions of the executive and OIRA prior to publication.
12  Analyses of legislative 
oversight of the bureaucracy (e.g., Bawn 1997) have generally neglected OIRA review 
altogether, even though it can effectively undermine whatever oversight tools the legislature 
devises.  While Kerwin (2003, 224-238) considers OIRA’s role in policymaking, similar to 
Cooper and West (1988), he argues that OIRA generally benefits the President over the 
                                                           
11 Analysis of models wherein the executive possesses veto authority over agency actions (e.g., Volden 2002a, 
2002b) have identified how the potential for ex post control can influence the initial delegation decision. 
12 Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (forthcoming), however, consider a model wherein an agency creates policy 
that is subject to veto by a reviewing agency such as OIRA, which bases its decision on the expected quality of the 
proposed regulations. 9 
Congress; and he focuses little systematic attention to the policy impacts of executive 
clearance.
13
  Kerwin’s arguments are echoed by scholars of the “administrative presidency” (e.g., 
Nathan 1983, Moe 1985, Waterman 1989) who have characterized OIRA’s continued existence 
as one more example of the rise of presidential control over contemporary policymaking (Cooper 
2002, 93-95; Howell 2003).  Moreover, Moe and Wilson (1994, 34-30) and Moe and Howell 
(1998, 168) have argued that Congress would strictly prefer to abolish OIRA, but cannot because 
“collective action problems” prevent Congress from coordinating the diverse preferences of its 
members towards a unified goal.  While such arguments seem plausible, they do not comport 
well with a substantial body of legislative scholarship (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 
1996) that illustrates how Congress makes resolute choices based on the preferences of certain 
pivotal members.   
  Third, while administrative law scholars have considered the impacts of OIRA review on 
policymaking to varying degrees, they have arrived at decidedly mixed opinions with respect to 
its positive and normative consequences.  DeMuth and Ginsburg (1994) and Seidenfeld (1994) 
have argued that OIRA review benefits society because the president is in the best position, 
institutionally speaking, to evaluate regulations based on the merits.  In contrast, Bruff (1989) 
and Strauss and Sunstein (1986) have argued that prevailing procedures should be altered to 
enhance the efficiency and benefits of regulatory review.  Finally, Elliot (1994), Morrison 
(1986), and Shapiro (1994) have claimed that OIRA review undermines the intentions of 
Congress, biases policy outcomes in favor of the president, and degrades the quality of 
regulatory policy.  Croley’s (2003) large-sample study of OIRA review uncovers several 
findings that could be interpreted to support a variety of these perspectives.     
  While existing scholarship offers little in terms of definitive answers, consensus appears 
to have been reached regarding certain features of OIRA.  First, over the past twenty-five years, 
OIRA has become a central player in administrative policymaking in the United States, inducing 
changes in nearly 70% of the agency rules it reviews.  Second, OIRA intervention generally 
appears to benefit the President at the expense of competing interests, particularly Congress.  
                                                           
13 Balla, Deets and Maltzman (2005), demonstrate how ex parte communication with OIRA during regulatory 
review influences the length of OIRA review time, as well as the possibility that rules are altered.  These authors 
note that their findings do not clearly demonstrate who stands to gain or lose from such delays and alterations.  
Hence, it is not obvious that the President, and the interests that he favors, generically benefit from OIRA review. 10 
Third, Congress would presumably like to abolish OIRA, but is unable to do so because of 
legislative coordination problems.  Fourth, OIRA review could benefit different constituencies, 
depending on which theoretical perspective is embraced. 
  Accepting these preliminaries leads to several questions.  First, while OIRA obviously 
engages agencies during the rulemaking process, how does OIRA intervention map into policy 
outputs?  Second, does OIRA intervention truly benefit the President at the expense of 
congressional interests?  Third, would Congress truly prefer to abolish OIRA but cannot due to 
collective action problems?  Fourth, how can one evaluate the normative claims that OIRA 
intervention leads to rules that significantly deviate from legislative intent and decrease social 
welfare?  The theory presented below provides a first step towards answering these questions. 
 
 
4. A Theory of Agency Policymaking with Competing Principals
 
  The model developed here, referred to as the delegation with competing oversight game, 
involves a legislature that delegates policymaking authority to an agency, which then makes 
policy that is subject to OIRA review.  I assume that actors have preferences over policies, which 
are influenced by the political ramifications of the policies finally implemented.  More 
specifically, I assume that the legislature and executive have well-defined policy preferences, yet 
they do not know at the time a policy is proposed whether it will be deemed important to their 
constituents, ex post, which would presumably induce them to care about it.  This uncertainty 
over political salience could arise because actors do not have perfect information about their 
constituencies’ policy priorities, or more generally, whether their constituencies will be attentive 
to certain policy debates.  For example, while a conservative President might strongly suspect 
that social conservatives will be interested in how the FDA regulates pharmaceuticals such as 
RU-486, he/she does not know with certainty, ex ante, how intense their reaction to proposed 
regulations will be, and what kind of presidential response it will warrant.  Likewise, for policies 
more innocuous than regulating RU-486 (e.g., the regulation of ethylene oxide), the executive’s 
expectations about constituent reaction are likely less certain.  The uncertainty about the political 
ramifications of policies provides for certain circumstances under which both Congress and the 
President will strictly prefer the institution of OIRA review to a world in which OIRA review did 
not exist. 11 
In equilibrium, OIRA only intervenes when an agency’s proposed rule is revealed to be 
salient to the Executive’s interests after it is proposed.  If OIRA intervenes, it alters an agency’s 
proposed rule so that it is more reflective of presidential preferences than was the initial 
proposal.  Alternatively, if it does not intervene, the agency’s rule stands as proposed and is 
promulgated into law.  This potential for OIRA review induces the agency to strategically 
propose policies that diverge from its ideal point and actually favor Congress over the Executive, 
to effectively limit the range of OIRA’s influence, if it were to intervene.  The magnitude of the 
policy divergence between the agency’s proposed rule and congressional preferences depends on 
the probability of OIRA intervention.  Hence, in certain situations the agency proposes policies 
that are relatively close to Congress, and revealed to be politically salient to congressional 
interests, yet are not altered by OIRA.  In other situations, agency policies are altered by OIRA, 
yet those policies are not salient to Congress, and hence it doesn’t mind OIRA intervention.  
Finally, in certain cases agency policies are altered by OIRA and both branches of government 
find the policies salient to their interests, creating an obvious conflict.  Despite this potential for 
conflict, the institution of executive clearance may still make both actors strictly better off than 
what would occur if OIRA did not exist, depending on the relationship between the Executive 
and congressional preferences, and their expectations over policy salience. 
Preliminary developments 
  Before moving on, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of assuming that the 
executive and the agency have different policy preferences.  Given this simple assumption, the 
potential for the agency to account strategically for OIRA intervention in its initial policy 
proposal can be easily identified.  For the purposes of illustration, suppose that agency 
rulemaking can be represented as a very simple two-period, complete and perfect information 
game between two players, an Agency with ideal point A, and OIRA, with ideal point E.
14  
Assume that both actors’ ideal points are defined over one dimension (E and A ∈ R
1), and 
assume that the agency is located to the left of OIRA (A < E). 
In period 1, the Agency selects a policy a ∈ R
1, and in the second period, OIRA observes 
the policy chosen by the Agency, and if it decides to do so, changes policy subject to a cost.  
Because agencies are located in the executive branch, one might interpret OIRA’s costs as 
                                                           
14  E stands for the ideal point of the Executive, which OIRA is assumed to represent.  This is a simplifying 
assumption given that the OIRA Administrator is nominated by the President and is subject to Senate confirmation.   12 
reflecting the political costs it incurs from overriding its own administration’s policy.   
Alternatively OIRA’s costs could also reflect the time and effort that OIRA staffers devote to 
determining alternative policy options to the Agency’s proposal, which faces lower costs as a 
policy specialist.
15  The actors’ preferences are defined over the final policy implemented, x, 
which is either the Agency’s proposed policy, x = a, or the policy proposed by OIRA, as well as 
the costs they must pay to change policy (in the case of OIRA).  More specifically, assume that 
the Agency’s and OIRA’s preferences can be represented by the following utility functions: 
Ux Ax A() ( ) =− −
2  
Ux Ex c ax E() ( ) ( ) =− − − −
22  
where c > 0 represents the cost OIRA faces from moving policy away from where the agency 
proposed.
16  Given this parsimonious set-up, what expectations do we have regarding the initial 
policies proposed by the Agency, and the final policy implemented following OIRA review? 
  A straightforward application of backwards induction yields the equilibrium agency 
proposal and final policy, a* and x*(a*), for this model.  In the last period, having been proposed 
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17  In other words, for any agency proposal, OIRA will choose x so 
that it is somewhere in between its ideal point and the agency proposal, depending on how costly 
it is to move policy.  When costs are very low (c = 0), OIRA can move the policy to its ideal 
point, and as c increases, the final policy is closer to the Agency proposal.  Because the Agency 
knows that for any policy it proposes, x*(a) will be the final policy implemented, it will chose a* 
to maximize its ex ante utility: 
2 ))
1
( ( )) ( (
c
ca E
A a x U A +
+
− − = .  Analysis reveals that 
                                                           
15 Olson (1984, 14) notes how the EPA consistently complained about having to educate OMB staff about the details 
of particular rulemakings in the early 1980s.  Unlike substantive policy agencies that have considerable staff 
resources, OIRA is currently staffed by 55 FTEs (United States General Accounting Office 2003, 60). 
16 Costs to the Executive might increase in the scope of policy change for several reasons.  If costs reflect political 
costs, they should be larger for more significant policy changes, to correspond to more substantial public signals of 
dissention within the Executive branch.  Alternatively, if costs reflect labor costs, the level of analysis undertaken by 
OIRA is likely to be strictly greater to warrant larger changes, than that required for marginal changes from the 
agency’s policy proposal.   
17This expression is obtained by taking the first derivative of UE(x) with respect to x, setting it equal to zero, and 
solving for x*.  That is,  .
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18  In other words, faced with the prospect of ex post review by 
OIRA, the Agency will propose a policy to the left of its ideal point, knowing that OIRA will 
move the policy as far towards E as possible, subject to the cost it must pay, which will yield a 
final policy at the Agency’s ideal point.  Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium of this model, where 
A = 2, E = 3, and c = 1.   Under this specification the initial Agency proposal is at a* = 1, which 
generates a final policy located exactly at the Agency’s ideal point (x*(a*) = 2). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
This simple model clearly demonstrates how the sequential nature of policymaking and 
executive review, given actors’ preference divergence, provides the Agency with an incentive to 
propose policies that effectively lessen the influence of OIRA intervention.  The broader model 
developed below builds on this insight by incorporating the legislature as an additional player, 
and considering a policy environment in which OIRA review does not occur with certainty.   
Players and preferences 
  The actors in this model consist of a Legislature with ideal point L, a substantive policy 
Agency with ideal point A, and an agency that engages in executive oversight (OIRA) with ideal 
point E.  Similar to the baseline model above, I assume that all actors’ ideal points, L, E, and A ∈ 
R
1, and that L < A < E.  In other words, I explicitly assume that the Agency is located somewhere 
in between the Legislature and OIRA.
19  Without loss of generality, I assume that L = 0.   All 
actors’ preferences are defined over the final policy implemented, as well as any costs they must 
incur to influence the location of the policy, and whether a particular policy is politically salient 
to their interests.  That is, I explicitly assume that certain policies are, ex post, more salient to the 
actors’ interests than other policies.  As noted above, these variations in salience might reflect 
                                                           
18 The quantity a* is obtained by taking the first derivative of UA(x(a)) with respect to a, setting it equal to zero, and 























19 This assumption is reasonable given that agency heads are proposed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, 
and hence they are likely located somewhere between these two actors’ ideal points.  One might also be interested in 
analyzing cases wherein the Agency was located to the right or the left of both the Legislature and OIRA, perhaps 
because of entrenched civil servants.  I focus on the case where the Legislature and OIRA have divergent 
preferences, however, because it is the most difficult scenario to establish how OIRA intervention may be pareto 
improving for both actors. 14 
external constituency considerations, random shocks by nature, or other concerns that are not 
modeled here. 
More formally, the Legislature’s preferences are defined over the final policy outcome 
and any costs it must incur to create policy, and can be represented by the following utility 
function: 
k x L k x U L − − − =
2 ) ( ) , ( λ , 
where x ∈ R
1 is the final policy outcome, k ≥ 0 is the cost that it must incur if it chooses not to 
delegate to the agency and rather make policy itself, and λ  ∈{0, 1}, which is determined 
stochastically, identifies whether the policy under consideration is politically salient to the 
Legislature.  Hence, while the Legislature generically prefers policies that are located closer to 
its ideal point, some policies will be revealed to be not politically salient (λ = 0), so that the 
Legislature will be indifferent between a variety of policies, including those that are far away 
from its ideal point.
20
The Agency’s preferences are defined over the final policy outcome, and can be 
represented by the following utility function: 
Ux Ax A() ( ) =− −
2 . 
  Unlike the Legislature, this specification implies that the agency considers all policies 
salient, which could be interpreted as the agency responding to its legislative mandate to create 
policy, or the fact that agencies are generally issue-specific in their focus.      
  Finally, OIRA’s preferences are defined over the final policy outcome, the political 
salience of policies, and how costly it is to alter the substantive agency’s policy proposal. More 
formally, OIRA’s preferences can be represented by the following form: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( x a c x E x U E − − − − = ε , 
where a is the Agency’s proposal, x is the final policy chosen by OIRA, c ≥ 1, and ε ∈{0, 1}, 
which is determined stochastically.
21  Hence, conditional on OIRA learning that a policy is 
                                                           
20 While this is admittedly a very stylized way to denote that the Legislature cares more about some policies than 
others, similar results would follow from allowing λ to take on values between zero and 1. 
21 The assumption that  is not necessary for derivation of the equilibrium, but facilitates a parsimonious 
presentation of the comparative statics, which would be somewhat cumbersome for certain cases when 
1 ≥ c
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ c . 15 
politically salient (ε = 1), its utility is determined by how far the final policy (x) is located from 
its ideal point (E), as well as how far the final policy is from the Agency’s proposal (a).
22
Sequence of play 
  The delegation with competing oversight game begins in stage 1 with Nature jointly 
determining whether a policy under consideration is salient to OIRA and/or the Legislature with 
the following probabilities: with probability p1, the policy is salient to both OIRA and the 
Legislature (ε  = 1, λ  = 1), with probability p2, the policy is salient to OIRA, but not the 
Legislature (ε = 1, λ = 0), and with probability p3, the policy is salient to the Legislature, but not 








23  To reinforce a point above, this probability distribution 
represents fact that, ex ante, actors might not have perfect information regarding their 
constituencies’ priorities.  After explicit policies are proposed, however, actors likely receive 
information from their constituencies which might induce them to care about the policies in 
question (i.e., McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).   
In stage 2 the Legislature makes a legislation decision, l= (d,  xL) consisting of a 
delegation decision (d  ∈{1, 0}) for whether or not to cede policymaking authority to a 
substantive Agency, and a policy decision xL ∈{∅, R
1}.  I consider a very coarse delegation 
mechanism, whereby if the Legislature delegates authority to the Agency (d = 1), the Agency has 
complete discretion over where to set policy.  Alternatively, if it does not delegate to the Agency 
(d = 0), the Legislature decides where to set policy, xL∈R
1, subject to paying a fixed cost, k ≥ 0.  
If the Legislature chooses not to delegate to the agency and create policy internally, Nature’s 
move is then revealed (regarding policy salience), the game ends, and payoffs are disbursed.  In 
stage 3, assuming that delegation has occurred, the Agency chooses a policy a ∈ R
1, which will 
potentially be subject to OIRA review.  Finally, in Stage 4, OIRA observes the Agency proposal 
                                                           
22 One might also consider an extension wherein the Agency suffers a similar cost if OIRA intervenes and changes 
policy.  Analysis of such a model yields substantively similar results to the model developed here, so long as the 
marginal cost incurred by OIRA is greater than that incurred by the Agency. 
23 A more general model can be analyzed in an analogous manner that assumes with probability p4 ≥ 0 the policy is 
salient to neither actor (ε = 0, λ = 0), where  .  The current model disregards this option, given that it seems 
unlikely that there exist any policies for which no constituency of the executive or legislature would express 








and ascertains whether the policy area is politically salient to its interests, and then chooses a 
final policy, xE ∈R
1.
24   
For the purposes of analysis, I assume that p2 = p3 = p.  That is, the probability that the 
Nature reveals that a policy is salient to Legislature but not to OIRA is equal to the probability 
that the opposite ensues.  Put simply, p characterizes ex post divergent preferences, while p1 = 1-
2p characterizes ex post aligned preferences.
25  The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash 
where I assume that in the case of indifference, the Legislature delegates to the Agency, and 
Figure 2 presents the extensive game form. 
 




  The equilibrium to this game can be deduced by employing backwards induction.   
Building on the results of the simple two-player model of policymaking above, it is obvious that 
if the Legislature delegates to the Agency, then conditional on the policy being salient to OIRA, 








) ( *  for any Agency policy, a.  Because it is common 
knowledge that OIRA will select x*(a) if it learns that the policy is salient, the Agency will 
choose a policy, a, that maximizes its expected utility, which is influenced by the probability of 
OIRA intervention.  More formally, the agency will choose a policy, a, that maximizes the 
following function: 
2 2 ) ( ) ) ( * )( 1 ( ) ( a A p A a x p a EU E A − − − − − = . 
Applying the calculus yields the optimal policy chosen by the agency: 
cp p c
p Ec c p Ac Ap
a
2
) 1 ( ) 1 (
*
2 + +
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= . 
                                                           
24 One might question whether OIRA intervention is really tantamount to a simple veto over agency policy proposals 
(as in Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2006), or policy alterations as modeled here.  The current modeling 
choice seems appropriate in light of the examples noted above, and numerous other documented cases of OIRA 
intervention (e.g., O’Connor (1988, 196), Olson (1984) Percival (2001, 994)) wherein OIRA dictated to agency 
officials what changes were required in order to secure its approval. 
25 This restriction is not crucial for deriving and characterizing equilibria, and the qualitative properties of the final 
policies enacted under delegation are identical to a more general model (where p2 ≠ p3).  Employing this assumption, 
however, is useful in facilitating the derivation of comparative statics analysis on the critical value of p, such that the 
legislature would strictly prefer the existence of OIRA, to delegating without OIRA oversight. 17 
  In light of what will occur under delegation, the Legislature considers the following: if it 
creates policy internally, it can promulgate its ideal policy, but must pay cost k.  If it delegates to 
the Agency, however, the Legislature might end up with a* (which could be quite favorable to its 
interests) with probability p, but it could end up with x*(a*) (which could be quite undesirable), 
if the policy is revealed to be salient to the Executive with probability (1-p).  Given these 
tradeoffs, the Legislature makes its delegation decision based on the costs it faces from making 
policy internally, in comparison to the expected final policy that corresponds to delegation.   
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium of this game.  (Proofs of all results are in the 
appendix.) 
Proposition 1:  The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium to the delegation with competing 
oversight game is defined as an optimal legislation decision by the Legislature, an optimal 
agency policy proposal, and an optimal oversight decision by OIRA as follows: 
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Hence, the Legislature bases its initial delegation decision on how the costs of internal 
policymaking compare to its expected utility if policy is outsourced to an Agency.  The expected 
utility from delegation, in turn, depends on the probability that the Executive learns that a policy 
is salient, which would induce OIRA intervention following agency policymaking, as well as the 
probability that the policy is not salient to the Executive, resulting in the Agency’s proposed 
policy.  In all cases following delegation, the Agency’s proposed policy is closer to Legislature’s 
ideal point than the promulgated policy following OIRA intervention. 
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium Agency and OIRA proposals, a* and x*(a*), 
respectively, for the case where L = 0, A= 2, E = 3, c = 1, and
3
1
= p .  In other words, one-third 
of the time the policy is revealed to be salient to the Legislature but not the Executive, one-third 18 
of the time the opposite holds, and one-third of the time the policy is revealed to be salient to 
both actors, ex post. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
  In comparing Figure 3 to Figure 1, it is clear that when the Agency is uncertain about 
the potential for OIRA intervention, it no longer proposes a policy that substantially deviates 
from its ideal point, such as a* = 1.  Instead, it proposes a policy closer to its ideal point because 
it knows with a certain probability (
3
1
= p ) OIRA will not intervene, and a* will become the 
final policy.  Of course, because OIRA intervention might occur (with probability
3
2
) 1 ( = − p ), 
the Agency proposal still deviates from the Agency’s ideal point, favoring the Legislature, to 
ensure that any x*(a*) chosen by OIRA will be relatively favorable to Agency interests.  Given 
these tradeoffs and the assumptions above, the equilibrium Agency proposal will be 
3
5
* = a , 
which will induce 
3
7
*) ( * = a x  if OIRA intervenes; and the Legislature will delegate to the 
Agency, given the potential for OIRA oversight, if 
9
41
≥ k . 
Will the legislature ever want the possibility of OIRA intervention? 
Consideration of Proposition 1 provides us with insight as to why the Legislature might 
prefer OIRA intervention to a situation in which there was no executive clearance.  The above 
results imply that delegation will occur whenever it is too costly to create policy internally 
( ).  Suppose however, that the Legislature had a choice of playing a similar delegation 
game, where it chose whether to delegate to an Agency, and if delegation occurred, the Agency 
created policy unilaterally and the game ended.  Without the prospect of executive oversight, the 
Agency would obviously propose a policy at its ideal point (a* = A), and the Legislature would 
only delegate when the costs from creating policy internally were greater than the distributive 
policy loss it experienced by outsourcing policymaking authority to the agency, or whenever k ≥ 
* k k ≥19 
A
2.
26  Comparing A
2 to the boundary on k in Proposition 1 above, one sees that depending on the 
values of p, delegation occurs in the delegation with competing oversight game for a wider range 
of cases than if executive oversight is not possible (i.e.,  ).  This intuition is stated more 
formally in the following proposition. 
2 * A k <
Proposition 2:  In the delegation with oversight game, there exists an ex post preference 
divergence probability cutpoint, p*, such that for p ≥ p*, the Legislature would prefer to 
delegate to an agency with the possibility of OIRA intervention, and for p < p*, the Legislature 
would strictly prefer to delegate to an Agency without the possibility of OIRA intervention. 
Because the possibility of OIRA intervention induces the Agency to propose policies that 
are closer to the Legislature than it would if oversight did not occur with certainty, the 
Legislature will strictly prefer the institutional arrangement modeled here to one in which OIRA 
did not exist, depending on the correlation between λ and ε.  In the starkest case, suppose that p 
= .5, meaning that every policy the legislature found salient OIRA did not find salient, and the 
opposite held true as well.  In such a situation, the Legislature would strictly prefer delegating 
with the possibility of ex post oversight to a world in which delegation occurred without the 
possibility of OIRA intervention.  Every policy the Legislature found salient would be located 
closer to its ideal point than the Agency’s ideal point, A, and every policy that OIRA decided to 
change would be a policy that the Legislature effectively did not care about. 
Hence, even though OIRA appears to be a coercive institution that generally favors 
presidential interests, its existence can actually allow both branches of government to realize 
benefits that would not exist if lawmaking occurred without its mediating influence.  As a result, 
each branch has clear incentives to maintain its institutional protection in the existing separation-
of-powers system.
27  The following Result identifies how this crucial level of preference 
divergence p* varies in response to the parameters of the model. 
Result 1:  Based on comparative statics over p*, the Legislature is, ceteris paribus, more likely 
to prefer OIRA review to delegation without OIRA when 
                                                           
26 If the legislature created policy internally, it would set policy at its ideal point and pay cost k, yielding utility equal 
to:  .  In contrast if the Legislature delegated to the agency, the agency would set policy at its ideal 
point, and the Legislature’s utility will be:  .  Hence, the Legislature will delegate whenever: 
. 
k k = − − −
2 ) 0 0 (
2 2 ) ( ) 0 ( A A − = − −
2 2 A k A k > ⇒ − < −
27 It is worthwhile to note that this insight emerges from analysis of a one-shot game between the Legislature, 
Agency and Executive, and is not an artifact of repeated-play interactions between these actors, as commonly 
invoked to support similar theoretical phenomenon. 20 
i)  it has relatively similar policy preferences (ideal points) with the Executive, 
ii)  it has relatively different policy preferences (ideal points) from the Agency, and 
iii)  the Executive’s costs of policy change are high (low), and when the Agency and 
Legislature have relatively different (similar) ideal points. 
  Taken together, Result 1 characterizes the conditions under which the Legislature is more 
or less likely to prefer the institution of executive clearance.  In explicating this result, we might 
begin by characterizing the expected policy following delegation subject to OIRA review as 
pc p c
A p p pE c p Ac
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Inspection reveals that as the Executive moves further away from the Legislature, so too, does 
the expected policy implemented.  Hence, the Legislature is more likely to favor OIRA review, 
ceteris paribus, when OIRA (i.e., the Executive) and the Legislature have similar policy 
preferences.  Analogously, the Legislature would be more likely to delegate policymaking 
authority to agencies subject to OIRA review, in contrast to independent agencies, when 
government is unified, rather than divided.  Consistent with this implication, Kiewiet and 
McCubbins’ observe (1991, 181) that during the divided government years of the Reagan 
administration, congressional Democrats consistently tried to subvert OIRA review by simply 
writing agency rules into law—that is, creating policy internally, in the context of this model. 
As the Agency moves farther away from the Legislature, the Legislature is more likely to 
prefer OIRA review because executive clearance induces the Agency to propose policies that are, 
ceteris paribus, more Legislature-friendly that what it would propose in the absence of OIRA.  
The fact that these agency proposals might be moved to x*(a) if OIRA intervenes is not 
problematic, so long as the Agency is sufficiently far away from the Legislature’s ideal point to 
make the possibility of OIRA intervention worthwhile in comparison to a world in which all 
policies were located at A with certainty.  For a similar rationale, when the Agency and 
Legislature are relatively close to each other, the Legislature is less likely to prefer the possibility 
of OIRA intervention as intervention becomes more costly (c increases), yet this relationship 
reverses when the Agency is relatively close to OIRA.  Because increases in OIRA’s marginal 
costs generally cause final policies (either the Agency’s proposal or OIRA’s policy) to be located 
closer to the Agency, the Legislature is less likely to prefer OIRA when the Agency and 21 
Legislature’s ideal points are relatively similar and OIRA faces high costs.
28  For some critical 
value of A, however, the potential policy gains that follows from delegation with OIRA are so 
great, that even as OIRA’s costs increase, leading to final policies generally closer to the 
Agency, the Legislature will still prefer the possibility of OIRA intervention given that 
sometimes the final policy implemented will deviate from the Agency towards the Legislature.
29  
How might Congress want to support OIRA? 
Having identified why Congress might clearly want to delegate to agencies subject to 
OIRA review even if OIRA might change policies in ways that are undesirable to Congress, one 
might ask how OIRA intervention or constraints on OIRA can influence social welfare.  Though 
not modeled here, Congress establishes OIRA’s budget through the appropriations process which 
presumably influences OIRA’s costs, and the effectiveness of OIRA review. Scholars (e.g., 
Shane 1995) have noted how Congress has historically leveraged appropriations to induce 
changes in OIRA review processes.  Implicit in these accounts is the notion that influencing 
OIRA’s budget can lead to policy outcomes that more appropriately reflect the interests of the 
American polity.  The results below explore these possibilities. 
Proposition 3: The expected policy enacted following delegation moves closer to Congress as 
OIRA’s costs increase. 
  As noted above, increasing OIRA’s costs has two impacts in regards to policy.  First, the 
equilibrium Agency proposal becomes more pro-Executive, which intuitively occurs because the 
Agency knows that OIRA will be constrained in its ability to move the proposal, and hence, 
offers more right-leaning policies.  Second, conditional on learning that a policy is salient, 
OIRA’s equilibrium policy becomes more pro-Legislature, because even though the Agency has 
proposed a more OIRA-friendly policy, OIRA has less resources with which to enact policy 
change.  While these marginal effects go in opposite directions, inspection reveals that the 
marginal impact of costs on OIRA’s optimal policy, weighed by the ex ante probability that 
OIRA learns that the policy is salient (1-p), is greater in magnitude than the marginal impact of 
costs, weighed by the ex ante probability of OIRA not intervening (p), on the Agency’s optimal 
                                                           
28 Comparative statics analysis on the equilibrium policies in Proposition 1 reveals that: 
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29 The non-monotonic relationship between c and p* follows from the Legislature’s risk-aversion, but is not an 
artifact of the quadratic utility specification. 22 
proposal.  Hence, as OIRA’s costs increase, the expected policy enacted following delegation 
becomes more left-leaning, favoring the Legislature.  In light of this finding, one would suspect 
that the Legislature would strictly prefer to increase OIRA’s costs, which would induce more 
left-leaning policies.  The following Proposition reveals that this is not always the case. 
Proposition 4: The expected utility of OIRA is decreasing in its costs, while the expected utility 
of the Agency is increasing in OIRA’s costs. Ceteris paribus, the Legislature’s expected utility is 
i)  increasing (decreasing) in OIRA’s costs when the Agency is relatively close to (far 
from) the Legislature,  
ii)  increasing (decreasing) in OIRA’s costs when the Executive is relatively far from 
(close to) the Legislature, and 
iii)  increasing (decreasing) in OIRA’s costs for lower (higher) values of c. 
Because increases in OIRA’s costs induce leftward movements in the expected final policy 
implemented, it is unsurprising that marginal increases in OIRA’s costs correspond to increases 
and decreases in the utilities of the Agency and OIRA, respectively.  The impact of OIRA’s costs 
on the Legislature’s expected utility, however, profoundly depends on the actors’ preference 
alignment and the baseline level of c, which influences both the Agency’s proposals and OIRA’s 
oversight capabilities.  For example (and consistent with the results above), when the Agency 
and the Legislature are closely aligned, the Legislature would prefer that OIRA’s costs be higher, 
because even though they will induce policies that are relatively close to the Agency, the policy 
divergence between the Legislature and Agency is trivial.  Alternatively, when the Agency gets 
sufficiently far away from the Legislature, it prefers smaller costs, as they induce the Agency to 
overcompensate in its initial proposal and propose policies that are relatively close to the 
Legislature; so that even if OIRA subsequently changes these policies, they will still be located 
somewhere reasonably close to the Agency’s ideal point.  The logic is similar in regards to the 
preferences of the Executive.   
The impact of OIRA’s costs on the Legislature’s expected utility is non-monotonic in that, 
ceteris paribus, when OIRA’s costs are low, the Legislature would strictly prefer to increase 
OIRA’s costs, which will cause the expected final policy to move sharply towards the 
Legislature from OIRA.  For higher baseline costs, however, increasing OIRA’s costs has a 
negligible impact on the expected final policy.  While it continues to move slightly towards the 
Legislature, the Legislature would be better off by decreasing OIRA’s costs, which would induce 23 
the Agency to propose more pro-Legislature policies to accommodate for a bureaucratically 
competent OIRA.  Given this non-monotonicity, the welfare effects of changing OIRA’s costs 
are ambiguous.  To the extent that the Legislature, the Agency, and the Executive represent 
different, and collectively exhaustive, sets of constituencies in the American polity, the sum of 
the actors’ expected utilities, might be interpreted as a measure of social welfare.  Hence, 
reforms aimed at constraining OIRA’s influence might not lead to general increases in social 
welfare, as both the Legislature and OIRA may be harmed; and in certain situations social 
welfare could be enhanced by actually strengthening OIRA’s oversight capabilities.   
 
 
6. Empirical Implications and Conclusion
 
In a separation of powers system, there is an obvious potential for conflict between the 
legislative and executive branches.  As each branch of government develops new institutions to 
influence the policymaking process, it is natural for scholars and pundits to observe these 
institutions and practices in action, and comment on how any given decision obviously benefits 
one branch of government over the other.  While such characterizations are straightforward to 
postulate, they may also be wrong.  This paper advances a new perspective by arguing that 
certain bureaucratic institutions are created and survive, not because they benefit one branch of 
government at the expense of the other, but because they can efficiently serve the competing 
interests of both branches.  The delegation with competing oversight game, which characterizes 
contemporary rulemaking politics in the presence of OIRA, demonstrates how the possibility of 
OIRA review generally induces agencies to propose policies that are biased away from the 
executive towards the legislature.  Moreover, because OIRA presumably only intervenes in 
rulemaking when the policies considered are salient to the executive’s political constituencies, 
executive clearance offers clear opportunities for political gains from trade between the 
legislative and executive branches.   
In certain cases OIRA will change policies to benefit the executive, while leaving other 
policies unchanged even though they favor the legislature.  If the legislature and the executive do 
not find too many policies salient to their joint interests, ex post, OIRA review can actually 
induce a positive-sum equilibrium in which each of these competing institutions can experience 
policy gains as a result of the agency’s strategic proposal.  Contrary to the arguments of many 24 
scholars, the legislature might actually prefer that OIRA be empowered with oversight capacity 
rather than be hindered by cumbersome procedures and insufficient resources with which to 
conduct review.  The model suggests that the scope of the policy gains experienced by the 
legislative and executive branches, as well as the locations of proposed and final policies, and the 
incidence of OIRA intervention, will depend profoundly on the preference divergence among the 
actors, the probability of political salience to the executive, and the relevant costs that the 
executive must incur to change policy.  This paper therefore confronts the puzzle of why a 
legislature might prefer ex post review by an executive over direct agency policymaking.  Put 
simply, executive review ensures that bureaucratic policies are responsive to their political 
principals in ways that could not be obtained if agencies were unconstrained.  These results 
suggest several testable hypotheses. 
First, it is clear that the initial decision to delegate should be influenced by the preference 
divergence between the legislature and the executive, as well as between the legislature and the 
substantive agency.  As noted above, one straightforward hypothesis that follows from the model 
is that the legislature is more likely to delegate to agencies subject to OIRA review during 
periods of unified rather than divided government.  Other scholars (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999) have found support for this hypothesis; yet regardless of whether government is unified or 
divided, Proposition 2 suggests that the legislature is more likely to delegate to agencies subject 
to OIRA review the more closely aligned they are to the executive, which goes beyond the 
predictions of existing theories.  By analyzing how legislative delegation varies with respect to 
the agency’s level of political insulation, as measured by the portion of the agency that is 
politicized by the President, one could assess the veracity of this prediction. 
Second, with regard to policy outputs, comparative statics analysis on the equilibrium 
policies identified in Proposition 1 implies that the substantive effects of OIRA intervention 
should be greatest on those policies that were a priori least salient to the executive.
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 The intuition behind this result is as follows: 
because the Agency views increases in p as relative decreases in the probability that OIRA will intervene, the 
Agency proposes more right-leaning policies as p increases.  Hence, considering p’ and p”, where p’ < p”, the 
Agency will propose a more OIRA-friendly proposal for p = p” compared to when p = p’.  Conditional on learning 
that a policy is salient to its interests (ε = 1) then, OIRA can move the Agency proposal closer to its ideal point for a 
relatively lower cost when p = p”, in comparison to when p = p’.  As a result, ceteris paribus, those policies that are 
farthest from the Legislature following OIRA intervention should be those policies for which, ironically, the 
probability of OIRA intervention is lowest. 25 
plausible indicator of policy change following OIRA intervention is the amount of litigation that 
emerges following publication of the rule in the Federal Register.  If OIRA intervention 
generates a rule that deviates from what would follow from conventional rulemaking 
proceedings, one would expect that the rule would likely be challenged on the grounds that the 
rulemaking process was arbitrary and capricious, and/or the rule deviated from the intentions of 
Congress.  Hence, it would be interesting to analyze the relationship between court challenges to 
rules following OIRA intervention, and the salience of the rule to executive interests.
31
Third, the fact that certain states have incorporated OIRA-like institutions into their 
administrative lawmaking processes point to clear opportunities for comparative state research.  
The results of the model suggest (among other things) that legislatures in those states with 
OIRA-like institutions should be more likely to delegate to executive agencies under cases of 
unified government than those states without OIRAs.  Consideration of this and related 
hypotheses can allow scholars to exploit the rich institutional variation that exists among the 
American states. 
Several theoretical extensions to this model are also worth considering.  First, one might 
explore other, more direct means of control that the legislature might exercise over OIRA.   
While the above model provides a rationale for why the legislature would prefer OIRA 
intervention, one wonders how the legislature might explicitly limit OIRA intervention in cases 
where the executive and the legislature have highly correlated salience factors over policies.  A 
natural extension to consider is allowing the legislature to affect OIRA’s costs, depending on 
issue-area. Similarly, one might also incorporate other institutional actors, such as the courts, 
into the delegation and policymaking process modeled here, to analyze actors’ decisionmaking 
given the possibility of judicial oversight.   
Other extensions to this model would explore the robustness of these results to variations 
in the legislative delegation mechanism, the introduction of uncertainty about the relationship 
between the policy chosen by the agency and the actual policy consequences that ensue, as well 
as the introduction of a reversion status quo policy that occurs in the absence of agency 
policymaking.  A final point worth emphasizing is that the positive-sum equilibrium derived here 
is entirely distributive in nature.  In other words, even if there are no prospects for informational 
                                                           
31More fundamentally, a crucial assumption of the model is that OIRA only intervenes on matters that are found to 
be politically salient to the executive.  One might test the plausibility of this assumption by analyzing how agency 
rules are changed across and within presidential administrations depending on presidential priorities. 26 
gains following delegation, positive-sum institutions can thrive in separation of powers systems.  
To the extent that agencies might provide clear informational benefits, one would suspect that 
the relationships derived in this analysis would be strengthened further.  Regardless of what 
direction is taken, the model developed here provides insight for why apparently contentious 
political institutions continue to survive and thrive in a contemporary separation of powers 
system.  As states and comparative democracies continue to explore various methods of agency 
and regulatory oversight, these results should provide insight regarding the likely impacts of 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The equilibrium of this game is established by backwards induction.  Upon realizing that policy 
under consideration is salient to its interests (γ = 1), OIRA will choose x* to maximize its utility: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) (   ArgMax a x c x E x U E
x
− − − − = . 
Differentiating UE(x) with respect to x and setting the first order condition equal to zero yields: 
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, which is the optimal policy, x*(a), 
implemented by OIRA, in the event that it chooses to alter a. 
In the previous stage, upon being delegated policymaking authority, the Agency will choose the 
a* that maximizes its expected utility, which is based on the probability that OIRA deems the 
policy salient and chooses to move it to x*(a): 
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Differentiating EUA(x) with respect to a, and setting the first order condition equal to zero yields: 
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the case of OIRA intervention. 
Finally, the legislature’s equilibrium delegation and policy choice is based on its consideration of 
its expected utility following from delegation in comparison to its utility if it creates policy 
internally.  If the legislature decides to create policy internally, it will incur cost k, and it is 
obvious that it will choose to set policy at its ideal point, yielding utility equal to: 
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Alternatively, if the legislature chooses to delegate to the agency, given the possibility of ex post 32 
intervention by OIRA, its expected utility is equal to: 
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will choose to create policy internally whenever k < k* 
Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove Proposition 2, it is sufficient to identify the critical value of p, such that the Legislature 
is indifferent between delegating to an agency that is subject to OIRA review, and delegating to 
an agency that sets policy without any ex post oversight.  If the Legislature were to delegate to an 
agency not subject to OIRA review, that agency would obviously set all policy equal it its ideal 
point, A.  Hence, the expected utility of the legislature under delegation without OIRA would be: 
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In contrast, as noted above, if the Legislature were to delegate to an agency that was subject to 
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Hence, setting these two expressions equal to one other, one can identify the critical value of p, 
whereby the legislature would be indifferent between delegating to an agency that is subject to 
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Solving the above expression for p* yields three roots:  } , 0 , { * B A p p p ∈ .  Analysis demonstrates 
that pA < 0, hence, the relevant solution which defines the critical p* = pB: 
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Proof of Result 1 
To prove Result 1, it is sufficient to identify the signs of the first derivatives of p* with respect to 
the variables of interest.  Analysis reveals that: 
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(Complete presentations of the relevant first-order conditions and c are omitted for space 
considerations.)  
Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove Proposition 3, it is sufficient to identify the sign of the first derivative of the expected 
policy, x ~ with respect to c. 
Given that 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
To prove Proposition 4, it is sufficient to identify the sign of the first derivative of the expected 
utilities of the Agency, OIRA, and the Legislature. 
For the Agency, 
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Inspection reveals that this derivative has several inflection points across the relevant domain 34 
that constitutes the parameter range under consideration.  More specifically: 
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 equal to 0 and solving for c (explicit form not presented here for sake of 
parsimony). 35 





















Figure 2: Model of Delegation and Agency Policymaking with Ex Post Executive Control 
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With probability p ≅ .33 OIRA
does not intervene and final 
policy is a*
With probability p ≅ .67 OIRA 




























With probability p ≅ .33 OIRA
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